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Congressional Power to Strip State Courts
of Jurisdiction
Michael C. Dorf
The very substantial literature on the scope ofcongressional power to strip
courts of jurisdiction contains a gap: it does not discuss the source of the
affirmative power of Congress to strip state courts of their jurisdiction. Laws
granting exclusive federal court jurisdiction over some category of cases are
necessary and proper to the exercise of the power to ordain and establish lower
federal courts, but what power does Congress exercise when it strips both state
and federal courts ofjurisdiction? The answer depends on the nature ofthe case.
In stripping all courts of the power to hear federal statutory claims and
challenges to federal statutes, Congress exercises whatever affirmative power
authorizes the substantive statute. However, Congress lacks affirmative power
to strip all courts ofjurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to state laws.
That conclusion is important in its own right but also complements views about
the scope and limits of congressional power under the Exceptions Clause of
Article I-such as Henry Hart's contention that the Supreme Court must have
such jurisdiction as necessary to play its "essential role" in our constitutional
system. The limit on affirmative congressional power to strip state courts of
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to state laws ensures that there will
be cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise its appellate jurisdiction in
order to play its essential role.
*Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Josh Blackman, Kevin
Clermont, Zachary Clopton, Sherry Colb, Richard Fallon, Henry Monaghan, James Pfander, and
Sidney Tarrow for very helpful comments and suggestions. Tyler Hammond provided excellent
research assistance.
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I. Introduction
Thirty-five years ago, Professor William Van Alstyne characterized the
scholarly literature on the power of Congress to strip courts of jurisdiction as
"choking on redundancy,"' and there has been no shortage of additional high-
quality commentary on the subject in the intervening years.2 Yet for all of the
writing on jurisdiction stripping, virtually no scholarship addresses the
question of what affirmative power Congress exercises when it strips the
jurisdiction of state courts.
This Article fills the gap. It argues that Congress has affirmative power
to strip state courts of jurisdiction to hear federal claims' in most but not all
circumstances. It distinguishes among four categories of state court
jurisdiction stripping.
1. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 897 n.9 (1984) (quoting a letter
from William Van Alstyne, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, to Gerald Gunther, Professor of
Law, Stanford Law School (Feb. 28, 1983)).
2. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043,
1048-53 (2010) (reexamining Congress's power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction in the wake
of Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), which held that a statute framed as stripping a federal
court of jurisdiction violated the Suspension Clause); Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards
of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 250, 252 (2012) (arguing that the executive branch
has an incentive to use its enforcement power to oppose congressional jurisdiction-stripping
measures).
3. For brevity throughout this Article, I generally use the term "claim" to encompass both
claims and defenses. Whether an issue arises by way of claim or defense may matter for statutory





When Congress vests exclusive original jurisdiction over some class of
federal claims in the lower federal courts (as it has done with respect to
intellectual property claims,' for example), it exercises its power to "ordain
and establish" lower federal courts under Article III and, with respect to
claims under or regarding federal statutes, whatever enumerated power
authorizes the adoption of the statute. Congress can, if it chooses, divest state
courts of jurisdiction over such claims in order to steer litigation into federal
courts. Legislation vesting exclusive jurisdiction in federal court is so
uncontroversial as not to register as "jurisdiction stripping" at all.
Accordingly, all of the interesting cases involving congressional stripping of
jurisdiction from state courts involve simultaneous stripping of jurisdiction
from federal courts (as indicated in the mere parenthetical references to
federal courts in the next three categories of jurisdiction stripping).
B.
When Congress divests state (and federal) courts of jurisdiction to hear
claims arising under federal statutes, it exercises whatever congressional
power authorizes the federal statute itself. The greater power not to have
enacted the statute in the first place includes the lesser power to enact a statute
that does not give rise to statutory claims justiciable in state (or federal)
courts. This class of jurisdiction stripping might be thought to raise concerns
related to the doctrine of procedural due process: if Congress purports to
grant substantive rights, there could be limits on its ability to deny those
rights via procedural limits, including limits on state court jurisdiction.
However, given recent trends, that objection would likely fail if litigated.6
C.
When Congress divests state (and federal) courts of original jurisdiction to
hear constitutional challenges to federal laws, it exercises whatever power
warrants the substantive provisions of those federal laws. For example, the
provision of the Portal-to-Portal Act that barred all courts from hearing
constitutional challenges to the substantive provisions of the Act' was
necessary and proper to the exercise of the Commerce power, which
authorized the substantive provisions of the Act. To be sure, a jurisdiction-
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). The statutory text provides in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks. No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.
Id.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
6. See infra subpart III(B).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (2012).
32018]
Texas Law Review
stripping provision might violate due process or some other so-called external
limit. Much of the voluminous literature on jurisdiction stripping addresses
the nature and scope of such limits, typically by focusing on the lonely real-
world example of the Portal-to-Portal Act.' But the questions raised in this
branch of the jurisdiction-stripping literature are best understood as
concerning issues other than Congress's affirmative power.
D.
Thus we come to a category of jurisdiction stripping that warrants, but has
not received, special attention. When Congress divests state (and federal)
courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to state (and local)
laws (and policies), it acts beyond its enumerated powers. Because such a
jurisdiction-stripping measure does not protect the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, it cannot plausibly be described as necessary and proper to
ordaining and establishing those courts-by contrast with the measures
described in category A. And because constitutional challenges to state laws
involve neither the application nor the validity of any federal statute, such a
jurisdiction-stripping provision cannot plausibly be described as necessary
and proper to the exercise of any federal power that could be said to warrant
such a statute-by contrast with the measures described in categories B and
C. As there is no other viable candidate for the affirmative power that
Congress might be exercising in this fourth category, such laws are
accordingly void.
This seemingly modest conclusion nonetheless has potentially
important consequences because in modem times jurisdiction-stripping
provisions have been most likely to be proposed for cases involving
"cultural" issues-such as desegregation, abortion, the Pledge of Allegiance,
and same-sex marriage 9-where local regulations and state laws reflecting
local, state, or regional cultural differences are more likely to resist national
norms than are federal laws. To be sure, challenges to federal statutes on such
issues also sometimes generate important constitutional decisions,"o but the
landmark rulings tend to come in cases that challenge state or local laws and
policies." As Professor Michael Klarman has explained, the Supreme Court
8. See Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (stating in dicta, in
considering a challenge to the Portal-to-Portal Act, that Congress may not strip jurisdiction in such
a way as to offend due process requirements under the Fifth Amendment).
9. See infra note 87.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744,775 (2013) (invalidating § 3 of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act).
11. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (invalidating state laws that
barred same-sex couples from marrying); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)
(invalidating a Texas statute forbidding same-sex intimate relations); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
116-18 (1973) (invalidating Texas statutes that criminalized abortions); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia law forbidding interracial marriage); Griswold v.
4 [Vol. 97:1
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is less of a countermajoritarian institution than commonly assumed; rather, it
tends to impose an emerging national consensus on laggard states and
regions.12
Does the conclusion that Congress lacks the power to strip state courts
of jurisdiction to entertain federal constitutional challenges to state laws
really matter? One might think not. After all, the very forces that make the
substantive laws of a state an outlier will likely be felt in the state's courts as
well. Accordingly, the right to challenge a restrictive South Carolina abortion
law only in the South Carolina courts or to challenge a restrictive
Massachusetts gun-control law only in the Massachusetts courts may not be
worth very much. Why should we care about Congress exceeding the bounds
of its affirmative power by eliminating state court jurisdiction to hear federal
constitutional challenges to state laws if state courts were not going to give a
sympathetic hearing to such challenges anyway?
The short answer is that this objection is overstated. For one thing, state
courts often take seriously their role as guarantors of federal constitutional
rights, even in controversial cultural cases and even at potential professional
cost to the state judges.' 3
Moreover, the limit identified here on Congress's affirmative power to
strip state courts of jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional challenges
interacts with other possible limits on jurisdiction stripping. As explained in
greater detail below,1 4 the least controversial of the various theories that deny
Congress an absolute power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction holds that
the Supreme Court must retain so much of its power as to perform its essential
role of ensuring the supremacy and uniformity of federal law." The so-called
essential functions theory-which, by contrast with some of the more
sweeping proposals for limits on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power,
is not much embarrassed by the Judiciary Act of 1789-would require that
the Supreme Court be permitted to review state court judgments rejecting
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut statutes banning contraceptive use
as applied to doctors providing contraceptives to married couples); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 486-88 (1953) (invalidating de jure racial segregation in public schools).
12. Michael Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145,
191-92 (1998).
13. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power ofCongress to Limit the Jurisdiction ofFederal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (contending that Congress may not
use its power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in a way that "will
destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan"); see also James E.
Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise, 78 TEXAS L. REV.
1433, 1435 (2000) (making a similar argument based on the need for the Supreme Court to maintain
"supervisory" control of the lower federal courts); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L.




constitutional challenges to state laws. Accordingly, the conclusion that
Congress lacks the affirmative power to strip state (along with federal) courts
of the power to hear federal constitutional challenges to state laws could have
real and important consequences by preserving access to the U.S. Supreme
Court for such challenges.
That conclusion could take on greater urgency in our current era of
political polarization, because the norms that have generally stopped
Congress from flexing its muscles under Article III have been breaking down.
Consider court packing. Although scholars continue to debate whether the
Supreme Court's so-called "switch in time" led to the defeat of President
Roosevelt's court-packing plan,16 since that episode, most politicians have
understood court packing to be beyond the pale. Lately, however, court-
packing proposals have emerged both from the right" and the left." Political
actors who deem court packing thinkable will have little reason to hesitate to
consider jurisdiction stripping as well. Tracing the outer limits on
congressional power over the federal courts could well become an exercise
with important practical consequences.
Yet even if no practical consequences were to follow, the exercise
undertaken in this Article would have analytical value. The stakes of the
debate over jurisdiction stripping have never been primarily practical. The
very high ratio of scholarly articles on jurisdiction stripping to actual
instances of jurisdiction stripping shows that the issue has theoretical
importance that goes beyond its immediate practical consequences.
Clarifying the nature and scope of the limits on Congress's power to allocate
decision-making authority among the state and federal courts helps to clarify
the nature and scope of the broader role of the courts in our constitutional
system.
The balance of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part II surveys the
relevant legal landscape by providing a much condensed overview of the
jurisdiction-stripping literature. It does so with an eye towards distinguishing
the subject matter of prior theories from the distinct question of affirmative
congressional power. Part III expounds the four categories of congressional
stripping of state court jurisdiction identified above. Part IV identifies
16. For an excellent account of the scholarly debate, see generally Laura Kalman, Law, Politics,
and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999).
17. See Memorandum on the Proposed Judgeship Bill from Steven G. Calabresi, Professor Nw.
Pritzker Sch. of Law, & Shams Hirji, J.D. 2017 Nw. Pritzker Sch. of Law, to the Senate and the
House of Representatives (Nov. 7, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11
/calabresi-court-packing-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7E-6G9S] (writing to Congress to propose
an increase in the number of lower federal court judgeships with the pretext of addressing workload
issues but with the real goal of "undoing the judicial legacy of President Barack Obama").
18. See Bob Bauer, Don't Pack the Courts, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/dont-pack-the-courts/564479/
[https://perma.cc/SR2T-87AJ] (seeking to rebut "[p]rogressives responding to Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy's retirement with a proposal for court packing").
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practical and theoretical consequences by exploring the relation between the
limit on affirmative congressional power and the limits proposed in the
voluminous scholarly literature. Part V concludes.
II. The Jurisdiction-Stripping Landscape
The sparse case law and voluminous academic literature on jurisdiction
stripping largely neglect the question of affirmative congressional power to
limit the jurisdiction of state courts. The next Part addresses that question
directly. This Part considers where the affirmative power question fits into
the ongoing debate over jurisdiction stripping. We can usefully frame that
debate against a default view that posits no limits at all on congressional
power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction in the sorts of cases that we care
about most.
The Supreme Court has never squarely rejected the default view, but it
is difficult to reconcile with the Court's interpretation of the Suspension
Clause as guaranteeing an affirmative right to habeas (absent a valid
suspension) in Boumediene v. Bush." Because state courts lack competence
to issue writs of habeas corpus in favor of persons in federal detention,20
Boumediene implies that Congress must, at a minimum, make a federal
judicial forum available in habeas cases. Whether Boumediene should be
conceptualized as undermining the default view as a general matter or simply
allowing that the default view must accommodate the Suspension Clause is
a question far afield from the main subject of this Article, so I shall simply
note it and move on to theories of jurisdiction stripping that posit additional
departures from the default view.
The main body of academic literature rejecting the default view includes
theories positing two kinds of constitutional limits on jurisdiction stripping:
limits internal to Article III and limits external to Article III. We have just
seen an example of the latter. The Suspension Clause is an external limit. As
I shall explain momentarily, external-limits theories rely on many other
constitutional provisions as well.
Theories of internal limits-such as the view articulated by Justice
Joseph Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee" and recast in modern times by
Professor Akhil Amar,2 2 as well as variants on Professor Henry Hart's notion
that the Supreme Court must be permitted to serve its essential role in our
19. 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008).
20. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 397, 409 (1871).
21. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816).
22. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 208-09 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View] (building on Justice Story's interpretation of Article III); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered
Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1516 (1990) [hereinafter Amar,




constitutional system23-identify Article III itself as an obstacle to some
versions of jurisdiction stripping. Whatever their functional justifications,
such views can be understood as construing the scope of congressional power
to constitute the lower federal courts and to make exceptions to the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. Internal-limits theories that build on Story's
view draw textual support from the repeated use of the term "all cases" in
Article III, Section Two.24 Internal-limits theories that build on Hart's view
draw on broader structural notions of the judicial role in constitutional
democracy.25
A second class of theories (which need not be mutually exclusive of the
first) posits the existence of limits external to Article III. Least
controversially, a statute that selectively strips jurisdiction according to an
illicit criterion (such as the race, sex, or religion of a party) would violate the
constitutional norm rendering that criterion illicit (in the foregoing examples,
respectively, the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause for race- and sex-based jurisdiction stripping, and the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses for religion-based jurisdiction stripping).
External limits of this sort should be conceptualized as applications of the
underlying constitutional provisions that render the particular criteria illicit
rather than as affirmative limits on jurisdiction stripping as such. Put
differently, one does not need anything so grand as a "theory of constitutional
limits on jurisdiction stripping" to say that a law that denies jurisdiction to
the federal courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions from Muslims but not
from persons of other faiths would be unconstitutional.
More controversially, some scholars argue that Congress may not
eliminate jurisdiction over any category of constitutional cases without
violating the constitutional norms thereby removed from judicial cognizance,
even where the jurisdiction-stripping provision does not itself deploy an illicit
classification.26 For example, under this approach, a law forbidding courts
23. Hart, supra note 15; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 7-34 (1980) (arguing that due process concerns limit
Congress's jurisdiction-stripping power); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498,506 (1974) (arguing that the national judiciary
was intended to, above all else, "hear and do justice"); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 165-67 (1961)
(arguing that a review of early Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes the existence of certain
indispensable functions); Sager, supra note 15, at 43 (offering a narrow version of Hart's "essential
function" theory).
24. See Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure, supra note 22, at 1501-02 (parsing the language of
Article IH, Section Two with a particular emphasis on the "shall" and "all" language within);
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. at.329-33, 336 (discussing the effect of "shall" on Article 1H, Section
Two).
25. See infra section IV(B)(2).
26. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out
ofthe Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 141-46 (1981) (characterizing the removal
of jurisdiction over a class of constitutional claims or defenses as the removal of protection for
[Vol. 97:18
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from entertaining Establishment Clause challenges to the Pledge of
Allegiance27 would violate the Establishment Clause, a law forbidding courts
from entertaining challenges to laws restricting abortion would violate the
right to abortion, and so forth. Such theories could be seen as emanating from
the underlying constitutional limits themselves (and thus could be assimilated
to the first, uncontroversial category of external limits), but it is not clear why
they should be-at least not as a general matter. A line of cases that made
that sort of connection, albeit in a different context not having to do with
jurisdiction, has in recent years been more or less repudiated.2 8 Perhaps a
sounder basis for this sort of external limit would be that Congress may not,
in a constitutional case, use jurisdictional tools as a means of directing a
particular outcome. 29 However, recent Supreme Court cases indicate that this
constitutional rights and thus an impermissible burden on the underlying constitutional rights); see
also Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for
Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L.
REv. 819, 821 (1983) (describing Tribe's argument as seeming "too subtle" and "too daring," but
justifying the same conclusion on the ground that, based on choice-of-law principles,
"[j]urisdictional bills that discriminate without sufficient reason against causes of action that the
legislature did not create are unconstitutional").
27. See, e.g., Pledge Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 699, 110th Cong. § 1632 (2007) (proposed
bill stating that no federal court has jurisdiction to hear or decide any question pertaining to the
interpretation or validity of the Pledge of Allegiance).
28. In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969), the Supreme Court articulated what
later became known as the "political-process" theory. There the Court invalidated an Akron, Ohio
amendment to the city charter that required a referendum vote in order to enact any housing
antidiscrimination ordinance. Id. at 387, 393. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 470 (1982), the Court relied on the political-process theory to invalidate a successful
Washington state ballot initiative that forbade race-based busing except as ordered by a court in
constitutional litigation. In neither Hunter nor Seattle did the invalidated provision itself use a racial
criterion, but the political-process theory condemned each one nonetheless because each imposed
special obstacles to citizens seeking legal change to benefit racial minorities. The political-process
theory can thus serve as a rough analogy for the more ambitious theories of external limits on
jurisdiction stripping. Under the political-process theory, new state procedures that make it difficult
for an identifiable group to obtain legal reforms that benefit the group may violate the equal
protection rights of group members; likewise, one could argue that laws eliminating jurisdiction
over some category of constitutional cases violates the rights of litigants who would otherwise bring
those cases. The analogy was a good one so long as the political-process theory had bite, but the
Court has recently all but eliminated the political-process theory. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (plurality opinion) (upholding Michigan ban on
affirmative action by public primary, secondary, and post-secondary educational institutions against
a political-process-theory challenge); id. at 1634 ("The broad language used in Seattle,... went
well beyond the analysis needed to resolve the case."); id. at 1640 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("I agree with those parts of the plurality opinion that repudiate th[e
political-process] doctrine."). Not surprisingly, Professor Tribe's approach relied on a powerful
analogy to the then-robust political-process doctrine. See Tribe, supra note 26, at 149-50
(expounding the implications of Hunter).
29. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227-28 (1995) (holding that a statute
requiring the reopening of final court judgments was unconstitutional on separation-of-powers
grounds); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 134, 147-48 (1871) (invalidating a statute
requiring the Court to dismiss certain post-Civil War claims for want of jurisdiction in "all cases
where judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the Court of Claims in favor of any claimant"
2018] 9
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limit is relatively easy for Congress to circumvent through clever drafting.30
The Portal-to-Portal Act31 was the closest Congress ever came to
enacting a real-life example of "jurisdictional gerrymandering" (in Professor
Laurence Tribe's memorable phrase),32 resulting in the judicial articulation
of this more controversial kind of external limit. The Act stripped all state
and federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain due process challenges to the
substantive provisions of the Act (which defined compensable working time
for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act in a way that arguably disturbed
vested rights under earlier judicial decisions).3 3 The Second Circuit declared
in Battaglia v. General Motors3 4 that the jurisdiction-stripping provision
would be invalid if the underlying substantive provision violated due process,
but because the court found no substantive infirmity, it did not invalidate the
jurisdiction-stripping provision either." The Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the issue that the Second Circuit addressed in what is best
described as dicta.
Due to the dearth of other statutes and decided cases, in the seven
decades since Battaglia was decided, scholars have repeatedly returned to it
in order to frame questions for theories of external limits on jurisdiction
stripping. Are due process claims unique? If not, are they among a small class
of claims-including, in addition, takings claims-for which the substantive
constitutional right also guarantees access to a court with jurisdiction in
which to make the claim? Or, per the Blackstonian maxim for every right a
remedy, does every substantive constitutional right carry with it a right to
court access? Can theories built on the Blackstonian maxim be reconciled
with immunity doctrines that sometimes block any remedy?36 Or was the
Battaglia court simply wrong to suggest that there are any external limits on
based on a pardon on both jurisdictional and separation-of-power grounds).
30. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (plurality opinion) (describing a federal
statute stripping federal courts ofjurisdiction over disputes relating to a particular parcel of land at
issue in a pending case as a permissible change in the law and thus "well within Congress'
authority"); Robertsonv. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438-40 (1992) (upholding a statute
that referred to two pending cases by name and that plainly dictated the outcome of those cases,
reasoning that the statute simply used a shorthand to change the applicable law).
31. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, ch. 52, § 2(d), 61 Stat. 84, 86 (1947) (codified
in relevant part at 29 U.S.C. § 252(d) (2012)).
32. See Tribe, supra note 26.
33. The jurisdiction-stripping provision was § 2(d) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which was set
forth in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 256 n.3 (2d Cir. 1948).
34. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
35. Id. at 257, 259. Readers who are new to the subject might wonder how the court could even
say that much, in light of the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The court held at the threshold that it
at least had jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Id. at 256-57.
36. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1784-85 (1991) (concluding, after surveying
"[m]odern. [immunity] doctrines," that "beyond any peradventure, [they] depart decisively from the
notion that the Constitution requires effective remedies for all victims of constitutional violations").
10 [Vol. 97:1
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jurisdiction stripping beyond the use of illicit criteria in the jurisdictional
provisions themselves (as in the uncontroversial race, sex, and religion
examples)?
As the large body of high-quality scholarship on both internal and
external limits on jurisdiction stripping indicates, these are fascinating
questions. But I have promised that this is not yet another article about
internal or external limits, at least not exactly. Rather, this Article asks an
antecedent question-What is the source of Congress's affirmative power to
strip jurisdiction in the first place?
With respect to federal courts, the answer is clear and taken for granted
in the internal limits literature: Article III. Pursuant to the Madisonian
Compromise, Article III empowers Congress to "ordain and establish" lower
federal courts.37 It is possible to imagine that this power might only have been
exercised on an all-or-nothing basis, in which case Congress would have to
choose between creating no lower federal courts at all or creating them and
vesting them with some minimum of jurisdiction to be determined by
Article III. However, more or less since the enactment of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, it has been understood that Congress's greater power to create no
lower federal courts includes the lesser power to create lower federal courts
and vest in them only some of the jurisdiction that could be vested in them
consistent with Article III, Section Two.38 Thus, according to the
conventional wisdom (which in its strongest form reduces to the default view
described above) Congress's power to strip the lower federal courts of
jurisdiction is just the nonexercise of its power to create and vest jurisdiction
in lower federal courts.
So far as the Supreme Court is concerned, Congress strips jurisdiction
when it makes "Exceptions" to and "Regulations" of the appellate
jurisdiction that the Court would otherwise have.3 9 Since the Judiciary Act of
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
38. For example, the 1789 Act did not vest general federal question jurisdiction in the lower
federal courts that the Act created. Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
§ 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (1789). Indeed, Congress has never vested all of the jurisdiction that it might
vest in the lower federal courts. Today, for example, cases that present a federal question within the
meaning of Article 111, but in which the question does not appear on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint, fall outside the scope of the jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,153-54 (1908), while diversity cases, in which there
is not complete diversity or in which the amount in controversy is below $75,000, fall outside the
scope of the jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). The Supreme Court expressly endorsed
the proposition that Congress can create lower courts without vesting in them all of the jurisdiction
that could be vested consistent with Article III, Section Two in Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441,
448-49 (1850); see also The "Francis Wright," 105 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1881) ("[T]he rule .. . that
while the appellate power of this court under the Constitution extends to all cases within the judicial
power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the power is confined within such limits as
Congress sees fit to prescribe. ... What those powers shall be, and to what extent they shall be
exercised, are, and always have been, proper subjects of legislative control.").
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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1789, Congress has exercised this power as well. Thus, under § 25 of the
original Act, federal questions could only be heard by the Court by writ of
error to state courts where the latter had ruled against the party staking his,
her, or its case on federal law.40 And since 1988, nearly the entirety of the
Court's appellate docket has been filled with a small number of cases that the
Court chooses by exercising the discretionary power to grant petitions for a
writ of certiorari.4 1 As a practical matter, the vast majority of cases that could
fall within the appellate jurisdiction as laid out in Article III are thus excepted
from the Court's exercise of jurisdiction-unless one is prepared to say that
the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction when it denies a petition for a writ
of certiorari.
Various theories of internal limits on the scope of congressional power
to strip federal courts ofjurisdiction may add substantial qualifications to the
foregoing accounts. In other words, theories of internal limits take for granted
that Article III gives Congress the affirmative power to strip some or even
most jurisdiction from both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court.
Such theories simply posit that this jurisdiction-stripping power is itself
limited by Article III as properly construed.
So much for the extant literature. The previously unexamined question
this Article addresses is the source of congressional power to strip state courts
of their jurisdiction. State courts are creatures of state constitutions and state
law, not Article III. So, even if we set aside all theories of external limits,
why can Congress strip state courts of any of their jurisdiction?
To understand the nature of the question, consider an analogy. Suppose
Congress enacted a statute forbidding all flag burning. Such a law would
violate the First Amendment,4 2 which is an external limit. But it might also
be deemed unconstitutional on the ground that nothing in Article I, Section
Eight nor any other part of the Constitution confers on Congress the
affirmative power to regulate flag burning.
Or, depending on how it were worded, the flag-burning prohibition
might fall within congressional power after all. A law that forbade the
burning of flags that had moved in interstate commerce would fall within
Congress's affirmative power (although it would still violate the First
Amendment), but a blanket prohibition without any such "jurisdictional
element" would be vulnerable to a challenge of the sort that felled the Gun
40. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86
(1789).
41. See Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 1257, 102 Stat.
662, 662 (1988) (giving the Court the discretionary power to review decisions by state high courts
by writs of certiorari).
42. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (invalidating a federal ban on flag
burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416-20 (1989) (invalidating a state ban on flag burning
as applied to politically motivated flag burning).
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Free School Zones Act in United States v. Lopez 43 and the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison.4
Likewise, a law stripping state and federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
some category of cases might violate an external limit of the sort explored in
Battaglia and the commentary on Battaglia, but even if an external-limit
challenge fails-and even if one accepts the default view with respect to
congressional power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts-for the law
to be valid there must be affirmative power to strip state courts of their
jurisdiction.
Does Congress have the affirmative power to strip state courts of
jurisdiction they could otherwise exercise? The next Part answers that
question.
III. A Typology of Congressional Control Over State Court Cases
This Part asks what power(s) Congress exercises when it divests state
courts of jurisdiction. As summarized above in the Introduction, the answer
differs based on whether Congress also strips federal courts of jurisdiction
over the same class of questions or cases.
A. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has long applied a presumption that the vesting of
jurisdiction over a class of claims in federal court leaves state courts with
concurrent jurisdiction over the same class of claims.45 Congress has
concluded that in the mine-run of federal question cases, a right to file in
federal court,46 coupled with a defendant's right to remove to federal court if
the plaintiff files in state court,47 suffices to protect federal interests. One
could disagree with that judgment on the ground that it denies defendants to
state law actions the power to remove to federal court where the federal issue
arises only by way of defense (because the removal statute only permits
removal where the complaint satisfies the well-pleaded complaint rule).
43. 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
44. 529 U.S. 598, 611-19 (2000).
45. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1990) (citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1, 25-28 (1820) (describing presumption as a product of "our federal system," in which
"the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government"); Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (acknowledging that state courts maintain
concurrent jurisdiction absent a provision to the contrary); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962) ("[C]oncurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in our
judicial history. . . ."); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517 (1898)
(explaining that, had Congress intended to strip state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, it would have
done so clearly); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876) (holding that "State courts have
concurrent jurisdiction whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it").
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
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However, no one doubts that Congress could, if it chose, broaden removal in
order to accommodate this and various other objections.
Given the possibility of expanding the class of removable cases in order
to afford a federal forum for the resolution of federal questions (or for that
matter, state law questions in diversity cases), Congress can provide a federal
forum for any case that falls within the permissible scope of the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts whenever any party prefers federal court. That
possibility then raises the question of what legitimate interest Congress
advances by divesting state courts of jurisdiction over cases in which all
parties prefer state court. How can a law stripping state courts ofjurisdiction
be necessary and proper to vesting jurisdiction in lower federal courts if no
interested party desires to have the case heard in federal court?
Nothing in the text of the Constitution expressly answers this question.
Indeed, at least with respect to federal questions, one might think that the text
of the Supremacy Clause counts against congressional power to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts. After all, in Testa v. Katt,48 the
Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause is not merely a priority rule
that state courts must observe in determining the validity of state laws, but
imposes an affirmative obligation on state courts to exercise jurisdiction over
federal cases on a nondiscriminatory basis.49 If the Supremacy Clause itself
obligates state courts to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims, how can
Congress override that obligation?
We might respond by construing the obligation imposed by Testa and
related cases as a mere default rule that applies only absent congressional
action: just as the case law presumes that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts absent action by Congress, so we might say
that the state courts have an obligation to entertain federal claims but only
absent action by Congress. The Testa obligation, in this account, would be
similar to the obligation of the states under the Dormant Commerce Clause:
rooted in the Constitution but excusable by Congress.s0
48. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
49. Id. at 393-94; see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740-42 (2009) (invalidating a
refusal by a state court to hear a federal cause of action, even when the refusal was based on a
nondiscriminatory jurisdictional rule). But see Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REv. 2033, 2059-61 (arguing that Haywood disregarded a longstanding limit under which
Congress could only require state courts of competent jurisdiction-as established by state law-to
entertain federal claims).
50. The Dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from enacting laws that discriminate against
or unduly burden interstate commerce, but because the doctrine is a judicial inference from
Congress's Article I, Section Eight power, Congress may authorize state laws that, absent such
authorization, would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981) ("Congress may 'confe[r] upon the States an ability to
restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy."' (quoting Lewis v.
BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,44 (1980))); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV,
and Interstate Relations, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1468, 1480-85 (2007) (defending the principle that
Congress may lift the restrictions of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
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Although Testa thus does not stand in the way of the conclusion that
Congress has the power to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction on the federal
courts in some class of federal question cases, we still have not encountered
a plausible justification for Congress's doing so. Yet the shape of such a
justification is plain enough. Even if the parties might all prefer that some
case be adjudicated in state court, Congress might reasonably conclude that
systemic interests in the development of federal law by Article III judges
justify exclusive federal court jurisdiction. After all, as noted in the
Introduction, cases involving the application or the validity of federal statutes
implicate not only Congress's power to ordain and establish lower federal
courts, but also whatever affirmative powers authorize the adoption of the
relevant statutes." At least with respect to those cases-which account for
the lion's share of exclusive federal jurisdiction-Congress could plausibly
decide that exclusive federal jurisdiction better serves the statutory policy
than concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction, regardless of the parties'
wishes in any particular dispute.
More broadly, whether involving federal statutes or not, adjudication
resolves disputes, but it also creates a public good, namely legal doctrine.5 2
Congress could decide that dialogue between state and federal courts
provides the best means of creating that public good in some or most cases
(as it has decided) but that it prefers exclusive federal court adjudication in
some special categories of cases (as it has also decided). Perhaps Congress
believes that federal court judges have greater expertise than state court
judges in some relatively technical area (such as intellectual property cases).
Or perhaps Congress believes that bias against some conception of the
national interest-even though acceptable to all of the parties in some
particular cases-justifies sending a category of cases exclusively to federal
court.
Whatever the precise justification, there is no real doubt that the
Madisonian Compromise entitles Congress to vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in federal courts-and thus to divest state courts ofjurisdiction-
in some cases in which state courts would be obligated to exercise jurisdiction
absent congressional action.53
51. See supra text accompanying note 3.
52. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-90 (1984) (contrasting the
public role of the judicial system with more private forms of dispute resolution).
53. I pass over interesting questions of the scope of this power. Exclusive jurisdiction over some
subclass of federal question cases seems uncontroversial. An attempt by Congress to vest exclusive
jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear diversity cases-especially if coupled with a requirement
of mere minimal diversity-would be potentially problematic on federalism grounds. Notably,
Congress has never attempted anything of the sort. Even when it has vastly expanded diversity
jurisdiction, it has still allowed for state court jurisdiction where all parties prefer a state forum. For
example, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 1711, 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (2005),
amended the U.S. Code to allow, inter alia, removal of high-dollar-value class actions arising under
state law where there is minimal diversity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012), but at least one
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B. Federal Statutory Claims
When Congress creates statutory rights and duties, it sometimes creates
corresponding judicial remedies, either through private rights of action or by
authorizing the executive branch to bring civil or criminal enforcement
actions. However, Congress need not make any particular right or duty
enforceable through any judicial mechanism. Congress can, if it chooses,
provide for exclusively administrative enforcement subject only to whatever
modicum ofjudicial review the Constitution requires.54 The failure to provide
for a full judicial remedy-in the sense of a freestanding cause of action
cognizable in state or federal court, as opposed to judicial review of an
administrative remedy--can be understood as a kind ofjurisdiction stripping.
It is an exercise, or perhaps more accurately, a withholding of the exercise,
of whatever affirmative power authorizes Congress to enact the statute with
only administrative remedies.
Congress also can be said to engage in jurisdiction stripping if it enacts
a law that has no remedies at all. Congress undoubtedly has the power to
enact legislation that creates no substantive rights or duties, as when it
declares this, that, or the other national commemorative day, week, or
month.s" But Congress can also enact hortatory laws that seem to create
defendant must still seek removal for the case to wind up in federal court. For an insightful critique
of some of the more expansive views of congressional power over state court jurisdiction, see
Blackman, supra note 49, at 2104-07. For present purposes, it suffices to note that even Professor
Blackman believes that "existing grants of exclusive jurisdiction are long-standing, uncontroversial,
and well-accepted .... " Id. at 2125.
54. Over three-and-a-half decades ago, then-Justice Rehnquist wondered whether the Court's
case law governing the power of Congress to assign adjudicatory responsibility to non-Article III
bodies, and by extension, to preclude judicial review of their rulings, were mere "landmarks on a
judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant armies have clashed by night," Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (alluding to but not citing MATTHEW ARNOLD, Dover Beach (1851),
POETRY FOUNDATION, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43588/dover-beach
[https://perma.cc/H53N-M5M7]), and the subsequent precedents have done little to clarify the
constitutional guideposts. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487-501 (2011) (following, but not
expanding, the Northern Pipeline analysis in holding that bankruptcy courts do not have
constitutional authority to adjudicate a debtor's state law counterclaim); Granfinanciera v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55-56 (1989) (applying Northern Pipeline in determining that a bankruptcy
trustee's statutory right to recover a fraudulent conveyance is a private right); Commodities Future
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986) (recognizing the lack of broad principles
applicable to Article III inquiries and adopting a fact-intensive balancing analysis); Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584-88 (1985) ("The enduring lesson of Crowell
[v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)] is that practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire
reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III."). We need not struggle with
these mysteries here because, as the text immediately following this footnote explains, Congress
undoubtedly has the power to enact statutes that are purely hortatory.
55. See, e.g., Zach Bergson, Congress Recognizes Wide-Ranging Issues in 'Day of ' 'Week of'
'Month of Resolutions, THE HILL (June 20, 2012), http://thehill.com/capital-living/cover-
stories/233687-congress-recognizes-wide-ranging-issues-in-day-of-week-of-month-of-resolutions
[https://perma.cc/K2HJ-K63J] ("In the 99th Congress (1985-86), the height of commemorative
proposals, lawmakers sponsored 275 of these resolutions - approximately 41 percent of public
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substantive rights and duties but provide no mechanism-not even a purely
administrative mechanism-for their enforcement.56
Why would Congress enact a law that purports to recognize some right
or duty but provides no remedy for violations? One answer is that such a law
could be said to affect moral rights and duties, which in turn could have
substantial consequences. Many people believe that they have a duty to obey
the law regardless of any sanctions for failing to do so; they are not, to use a
phrase made famous by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in The Path of the Law,
"bad m[e]n" whose only concern is to avoid legal sanctions.57 The declaration
by Congress of legally unenforceable rights and duties can affect the conduct
of such "good" men and women.
In any event, however effective or ineffective any particular law with no
enforcement mechanism might be, such a law falls within the affirmative
power of Congress because Congress does not need any affirmative power
not to legislate. Thus, Congress has all of the affirmative power it needs
(which is to say none) to "strip jurisdiction" from state and federal courts by
enacting laws that purport to create rights and duties but have no enforcement
mechanism.
Now suppose that Congress enacts a statute that purports to create rights
and duties and that also purports to create causes of action (and, where
appropriate, defenses) that enable litigants to invoke these rights and duties
in court but also strips state and federal courts ofjurisdiction to entertain such
laws during that session.").
56. For example, § 11081 of the tax legislation that Congress enacted in late 2017 effectively
eliminated any penalty for a taxpayer's failure to obtain minimally adequate health insurance
coverage beginning in 2019 by substituting a tax rate of zero percent for the prior rate of 2.5 percent
and substituting a fixed sum of $0 for the prior $695. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017). Yet the obligation to obtain such coverage, codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, remains technically in effect because the 2017 law did not repeal it. Granted,
at no point did Congress simultaneously vote for both the so-called individual mandate and the no-
penalty option. It is doubtful that any member of Congress wished for this particular combination.
Rather, this oddity resulted from the fact that proceeding via "reconciliation" in order to circumvent
the need for sixty votes in the Senate for cloture limited the kind of legislation that could be enacted.
See 2 U.S.C. § 641 (2013). The example nonetheless illustrates the conceptual possibility of a
substantive obligation with no enforcement mechanism. It will continue to serve that illustrative
purpose at the conceptual level, regardless of the fate of a pending lawsuit by twenty states arguing
that when Congress effectively eliminated the tax, it rendered the mandate unconstitutional, because
the mandate was valid only as an exercise of congressional power to tax. See Complaint, Texas v.
United States, No. 4:18-cv-00167-0 (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/files/press/TexasWisconsinetalv._U.
S._et al - ACAComplaint_(02-26-18).pdf. Even read for all it is worth, that lawsuit poses no
threat to Congress's power to enact hortatory legislation when acting within the scope of its
enumerated powers.
57. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(contending that "a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter
with the public force ... [because a] man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed
and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay
money, and will want to keep out ofjail if he can").
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cases. Put aside for the moment the question why Congress would want to do
such an odd thing. Does the affirmative power to not create any rights and
duties in the first place carry with it the power to create nominally judicially
enforceable rights and duties but to strip courts of jurisdiction to hear cases
involving these rights and duties?
To answer that question in the affirmative, we need to accept two
propositions. First, we need to accept that not creating a legal right or duty-
which, as we have just seen, Congress has the undoubted affirmative power
to "do" (with the quotation marks reflecting the fact that not doing something
is an odd kind of doing)-is the functional equivalent of purporting to create
a right or duty while providing no mechanism for enforcing that right or duty.
And second, we need to accept that this, in turn, is the functional equivalent
of purporting to create rights and duties as well as judicial enforcement
mechanisms (such as a private right of action), but then neutering those
enforcement mechanisms by withholding jurisdiction from any state or
federal judicial forum.
Moral duties and unenforceable legal duties aside, in this context
jurisdiction stripping with respect to statutory rights and duties appears to be
functionally equivalent to not enacting a statute in the first place. But to say
that is not necessarily to resolve the matter entirely. After all, the law
sometimes elevates form over function. There might be some reason to think
that congressional power not to enact legislation recognizing a right X or duty
Y is not legally equivalent to the congressional power to create a seeming
right X or duty Y but then to withhold any remedy. Or maybe there is some
reason to think that the nonenactment of legislation recognizing a right X or
duty Y is not legally equivalent to legislation recognizing a seeming right X
or duty Y and conferring a judicial remedy for violations of X or Y but
withholding jurisdiction from any court to provide that remedy. What sorts
of reasons might lead one to conclude that these measures, though
functionally equivalent, are not legally equivalent?
The most promising line of attack would be rooted in, or proceed by close
analogy to, procedural due process. If a law creates a property or liberty
interest, then the government may not deprive someone of that property or
liberty interest without fair procedures.s Individual justices have sometimes
argued that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed
in determining that right, a litigant ... must take the bitter with the sweet."5 9
Under this approach, a law seeming to create substantive rights or duties but
simultaneously denying a remedy or jurisdiction would be unobjectionable.
58. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (discussing the procedures required
to terminate social security disability benefits).
59. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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Yet case law rejects the bitter-with-the-sweet view, at least in some
contexts.o
Accordingly, we have the conceptual tools to construct a constitutional
rule under which the greater power of Congress not to create a substantive
entitlement in the first place would not necessarily include the ostensibly
lesser power to purport to create substantive entitlements but defeat them by
failing to provide for enforcement mechanisms or jurisdiction. Indeed, one
might even think that procedural due process itself forbids Congress from
creating substantive rights that rise to the level of liberty or property but then
withholding a remedy or jurisdiction.
Such a putative constitutional rule-whether conceived as an
application of procedural due process itself or as a limitation modeled on the
procedural due process doctrine but rooted elsewhere-would serve at least
two purposes. First, it would vindicate a personal interest of those individuals
who reasonably relied on congressional creation of a seeming right (or a duty
respecting that right imposed on others) in their conduct. To be sure, one
might say that no one could reasonably rely on a purported right that comes
without an adequate enforcement mechanism, but this sort of meta-
observation, if taken seriously, would defeat all reliance-based claims. The
law protects reliance (where it does) partly because of a background
normative judgment that people ought to be able to rely on the law.
That idea bears some relation to the second reason why the Constitution
might be understood to forbid Congress from establishing seeming rights that
are then. defeated through the absence of any effective enforcement
mechanism or jurisdiction: such a constitutional limit would give effect to a
principle that government ought to be honest. A legislature ought not to
appear to give rights (or assign duties) with one hand while taking them away
with the other. Dissenting from the decision upholding the power of Congress
to adopt the so-called individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act, four
justices relied on something like this general principle, arguing, inter alia,
that the obligation to purchase health insurance could not be sustained under
the Taxing Power because the statute did not call the mandate a tax."
60. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982). Where state law creates a
substantive entitlement, the Court explained:
Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that
because "minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are
not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it
may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action."
Id. (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)) (brackets in original).
61. See Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 661-68 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the government should be estopped from invoking
congressional power to tax, because statutory text and structure indicate that the challenged
provision is a mandate with a penalty, not a tax).
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But to state the obvious, that was a dissent. A majority in the Affordable
Care Act Case invoked the principle that what a law actually does matters
more than labels.62
More directly to the present point, although I have just sketched
plausible normative grounds for concluding that Congress's greater power
not to create rights and duties in the first place does not include the lesser
powers to create purported rights and duties while withholding causes of
action or jurisdiction to enforce them, no such conclusion appears justified
as a description of the current law. Indeed, any effort to construct such a
greater-does-not-include-the-lesser rule in this context swims against a very
strong tide.
Consider the question of when an act of Congress gives rise to a private
right of action to enforce the act. Although there was a time when the doctrine
regarded courts as junior partners of Congress tasked with filling in
enforcement gaps," that time has passed. The current case law more or less
requires a clear statement in the law to create a private right of action.' And
even those justices who do not go so far in presuming that acts of Congress
do not give rise to judicial remedies absent a textual declaration to that effect
acknowledge that Congress has the power to create what appear to be rights
and duties without thereby creating causes of action.
The cases denying implied rights of action do not involve the
manipulation of jurisdiction, of course, but Marbury v. Madison6" itself
appears to affirm the power of Congress to create rights with one hand that it
defeats with the other by withholding jurisdiction. The Court treated
President Adams's signing of Marbury's commission, as a District of
Columbia justice of the peace in accordance with a February 1801 law, as
creating a right in Marbury to receive the commission.6 6 Invoking the
Blackstonian maxim "that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy,"
the Court concluded that Marbury was entitled to sue for a writ of mandamus
in a court with proper jurisdiction; 67 however, because, in the Court's view,§ 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred original jurisdiction on the
62. See id at 562, 564-70 (rejecting the dissent's argument that Congress's framing of the
payment required for not purchasing insurance as a "penalty" rather than as a tax determined the
issue as inconsistent with established precedent).
63. See JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964) (recognizing the existence of an
implied right of action under § 14(a) of 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) as necessary in order to effectuate the
legislation's purpose).
64. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,287-88 (2001) (treating text as mostly dispositive
of whether to find a private right to enforce a statute). For a useful summary of the path of the
Court's approach to implied rights of action, see generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1854-58 (2017) (describing the evolution of Bivens actions to enforce constitutional rights by
reference to evolution of doctrine governing implied rights of action under statutes).
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
66. Id. at 167-68.
67. Id. at 163.
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Supreme Court in violation of Article III, Marbury could not obtain the relief
he sought. I recap this story-that should be familiar to anyone who has sat
through the first week of a constitutional law course-to note what does not
appear to concern Chief Justice John Marshall at all: when the case was
decided, there might not have been any court in which Marbury could have
sued James Madison (or anyone else) for his commission.
No lower federal court would have had jurisdiction because the federal
district courts were not given original jurisdiction in federal question cases
until 1875.6 And Marbury could not sue Madison in state court because, on
supremacy grounds, state courts lack the authority to issue writs of
mandamus against federal officers. 6 9
To be fair, Marshall might have assumed that Marbury could sue in state
court (presumably in either Maryland or Virginia) because state courts
sometimes granted writs of habeas corpus and other forms of injunctive relief
against federal officers in the pre-Civil War period. 0 Only after Tarble's
Case7 1 in 1872 was that avenue clearly foreclosed.7 2 But it is hard to see why,
if Marshall thought the assumption that state courts could hear Marbury's
petition was critical to the outcome of the case, he said nothing at all about
alternative venues. As written, the opinion in Marbury strongly suggests that
Congress can confer a right that entitles the right holder to a remedy, even as
it fails to provide any court with jurisdiction to vindicate that right.
To recap the argument of this subpart: (1) Congressional power not to
create rights and duties in the first place includes the power to create statutory
rights and duties that cannot be enforced in court, either because Congress
does not create a cause of action or because no court has jurisdiction to
entertain an otherwise proper cause of action; (2) one might object on
procedural due process or similar grounds that Congress .should not be
permitted to purport to confer rights that it defeats by failing to authorize a
judicial remedy or jurisdiction in any court; but (3) no such objection,
whatever its normative merits, finds support in the case law, which appears
to take for granted the basic proposition of (1). It thus follows that Congress
68. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875).
69. See McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat) 598, 604 (1821) (treating as essentially
unthinkable, on the authority of Marbury, the notion that state courts have power to issue writs of
mandamus against federal officers). But see N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250
U.S. 135, 141-42, 151-52 (1919) (reaching the merits on the same issue before ultimately denying
the writ).
70. See Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relieffor Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 265, 270-81 (2007) (chronicling nineteenth century state court cases that decided habeas
petitions brought by persons detained by the federal government); Charles Warren, Federal & State
Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REv. 345, 353 (1930) (claiming that for roughly eighty years, state
courts issued writs of habeas corpus in federal detention cases).
71. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
72. See id. at 410-11 (holding that claims for habeas relief are within the purview of "the courts
or judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone").
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has the affirmative power to strip both state and federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear federal statutory claims.
C. Constitutional Challenges to Federal Laws
In § 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, Congress forbade both state and
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the
substantive provisions of the Act. What power did Congress exercise when it
enacted § 2? The most straightforward answer-which I shall tentatively
defend in this subpart-is that the same power that authorized the Act's
substantive provisions also authorized § 2. And as the Second Circuit
recognized matter-of-factly in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., the
substantive provisions of "[t]he Portal-to-Portal Act, like the Fair Labor
Standards Act," which it amended, were "passed as an exercise of the power
to regulate commerce" among the states.7 3
Suppose that § 2 had stripped state but not federal courts of their
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the substantive provisions of
the Portal-to-Portal Act. We might then conceptualize the enactment as
falling into what I have called category A: the law stripping state courts of
jurisdiction to hear any category of federal claims would be understood as
necessary and proper to carrying out congressional power, under the
Madisonian Compromise, to vest exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts.
But that would not be the only way to understand such a law. Where, as
in my hypothetical variation on § 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, Congress
eliminates jurisdiction over state court actions that seek to invalidate a
substantive congressional enactment, we might also ascribe to Congress
another purpose: Congress seeks to prevent state courts from interfering with
the substantive provisions of the Act. If that is the goal of Congress, then, in
addition to whatever power it has to carry out the Madisonian Compromise,
it could also fairly be said to be exercising the Commerce Clause power. The
law stripping state courts of their power to hear challenges to substantive
provisions that exercise the Commerce Clause power is thus necessary and
proper to the exercise of the Commerce Clause power.
I take the foregoing logic to be unassailable where-as in my
hypothetical variation on § 2 of the Portal-to-Portal Act-Congress
authorizes (or leaves in place the general authorization for) jurisdiction in
federal court. After all, Congress could have various legitimate reasons for
not wanting state courts to invalidate acts of Congress, such as concems
about expertise, speed of implementation, or even state hostility to federal
policy. But if the power to close the state courthouse door is necessary and
proper to the exercise of the Commerce Clause power (which in turn
authorizes the Act's substantive provisions) as a means of preventing state
73. 169 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1948).
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court interference with the Act's substantive provisions when the federal
courthouse door remains open, it is hard to see why Congress would lack the
affirmative power to close the state courthouse door on the same theory when
it also closes the door to the federal courthouse. Either preventing state court
interference with the carrying out of a federal statute is an exercise of the
Commerce Clause power or it is not-and we have already seen that it is. Put
simply, where Congress closes both state and federal courts to constitutional
challenges to a substantive federal statute enacted pursuant to congressional
power X, it aims to prevent all judicial interference with the federal statute,
so that the jurisdiction-stripping provision is also an exercise of power X.
That, at any rate, is what I regard as the straightforward argument for
congressional state-courthouse-door-closing authority, even when Congress
also closes the federal courthouse door to constitutional challenges to federal
statutes.
One might object that the goal of preventing judicial interference with
the substantive provisions of the Act is not a "proper" means of exercising
the Commerce Clause power or any other affirmative power of Congress.
Why might that be? Let us consider several possibilities.
Quoting the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in McCulloch v.
Maryland, in the Affordable Care Act Case, Chief Justice Roberts argued that
no "great substantive and independent power[]" can be deemed necessary
and proper to the carrying out of some other, enumerated power because such
great and independent powers must be granted in terms.7 4 Might stripping
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to some substantive statute-from
both state and federal courts in order to prevent judicial interference with that
statute-be one of the "great substantive and independent power[s]" that
Congress lacks because it is not expressly enumerated?75
The short answer is no. Whatever one makes of the Chief Justice's
conclusion that imposing affirmative purchase mandates is such a "great
substantive and independent power[]," there is no reason to think that
stripping courts of jurisdiction is.76 After all, if it were, then Congress would
not even be able to strip state courts of jurisdiction when it vests jurisdiction
in federal courts. Thus, this first potential limit fails.
A second kind of objection works by analogy to other instances of
contingently valid exercises of congressional power. Stripping state courts of
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to federal statutes is only proper,
according to this objection, where federal courts remain open, because the
propriety of such an action is contingent.
As an elaboration of this objection, consider commandeering. Congress
74. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559-61 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)).




may direct state legislatures to enact laws or state executive officials to
enforce federal law, but only if Congress gives the states a choice whether to
do so or to take some other action, such as decline federal funds or submit to
conditional federal preemption.7 7 The anti-commandeering cases, this
objection goes, show that whether an action falls within congressional power
can depend on some other action Congress does or does not take.
Upon inspection, however, this objection mischaracterizes the anti-
commandeering doctrine. Under that doctrine, Congress has no power to
commandeer state legislatures or executives. Thus, when Congress gives the
states a choice whether to forgo federal funds or to accept federal preemption,
it is not exercising a "commandeering power," contingent or otherwise.
Rather, Congress is exercising the Spending power or preempting pursuant
to whatever affirmative power authorizes the preemptive federal statute. The
anti-commandeering doctrine does not provide a useful analogy after all.
In rejecting the anti-commandeering analogy, I do not mean to deny the
conceptual possibility of a power that is contingently valid. After all, other
branches of constitutional law encompass contingency. For instance, a
content-neutral law that regulates the time, place, or manner of speech is valid
if, but only if, it "leave[s] open ample alternative channels for
communication." 78 A municipality with two public parks could be thought to
act constitutionally if it denies a permit for a rally in Park 1 on content-neutral
grounds if it simultaneously offers a permit for the rally in Park 2 (or vice-
versa), but the municipality would act unconstitutionally if it made neither
park available. The constitutionality of closing Park 1 to a rally depends on
whether Park 2 remains open.
Are courts like parks? They could be. There certainly would be nothing
illogical about a doctrine under which some law is deemed necessary and
proper to the carrying out of an enumerated power where the government
also acts (or refrains from acting) in some other way, but not so deemed
where the government fails to act (or acts) in that other way. Yet, while such
contingency is conceptually possible, we still would need some reason for
thinking that this is the right way to understand enumerated powers when it
comes to jurisdiction stripping. But the only plausible objections to
jurisdiction stripping of this sort sound either in the rights of individuals to a
day in court or in a general structural requirement (not connected to the limits
of enumerated powers) that aims, in the words of Professors Fallon and
Meltzer, "to keep government within the bounds of law." 79
77. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997) (forbidding commandeering of state
and local executive officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (forbidding
commandeering of state legislatures).
78. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
79. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 1736.
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To say that Congress has the affirmative power to strip both state and
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to some
substantive federal statute in order to prevent judicial interference with the
policy of that statute is not to say that all or even any exercises of that power
are constitutional. Such jurisdiction stripping might well violate some other
constitutional norm. But it is nonetheless useful to distinguish the kind of
constitutional norm at issue.
Suppose that Congress passed a law forbidding the movement across
state lines of cars bearing bumper stickers critical of the President. Such a
law would clearly violate the First Amendment. But would it also fall outside
the enumerated power of Congress under the Commerce Clause?
Conventional doctrine would say no. The problem with the law is not that it
regulates a subject matter that is not interstate commerce; the problem is that
it censors speech. That is a First Amendment problem, not an enumerated
powers problem.
To be sure, it is possible to build the First Amendment objection into the
enumerated powers analysis. Under an analogy to such an approach, a law
stripping state and federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain constitutional
challenges to the substance of a federal law would not be "proper" to the
exercise of any power because (let us suppose) there is a constitutional right
to ajudicial forum to challenge a law's constitutionality. This approach might
be modeled on Professor Randy Barnett's view that affirmative powers stop
where rights begin. Barnett contends that "[a] 'proper' exercise of power is
one that[,]" among other things, "does not violate the rights retained by the
people."80
Yet Barnett's approach, while offered as a restoration of the original
understanding, is, in the contemporary context, a reform proposal. As the
bumper-sticker example illustrates, under modern doctrine, individual rights
operate as external constraints on the exercise of enumerated powers, but they
are not incorporated within such powers as internal limits.
This may seem like a mere semantic point, but it is more. As I have
noted, there is a substantial body of literature addressing the question whether
jurisdiction stripping violates a constitutional right to a judicial forum. The
present inquiry aims to answer a different question-Under what
circumstances does Congress have the affirmative power to strip state courts
of jurisdiction? If the only basis for concluding that Congress lacks such
power in some context is that state court jurisdiction stripping violates a right
to a judicial forum, then we will have simply incorporated the prior debate
into the affirmative powers question.
In so doing, we will have sown unnecessary confusion, because the
affirmative power inquiry, as I have described it, focuses on different




considerations from the inquiry into whether there is a right to a judicial
forum. A court that would conclude that there is a constitutional right to a
judicial forum will invalidate an act that strips jurisdiction in violation
thereof, regardless of what that court concludes with respect to affirmative
power. If such a court then incorporates its conclusion that a jurisdiction-
stripping measure violates a constitutional right into the affirmative power
analysis (per something like Barnett's general approach to rights), that will
make no difference to the bottom line. The inquiry that can make a difference
asks whether Congress lacks affirmative power to engage in jurisdiction
stripping in some context in which, by hypothesis, doing so would violate no
rights.
Accordingly, at least for the purposes about which we care, the
straightforward answer with which this subpart began holds: when Congress
strips state and federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain constitutional
challenges to the substantive provisions of some federal act, it exercises
whatever affirmative power authorizes the enactment of those substantive
provisions.
Before moving to our last category, I want to underscore that the
analysis of this subpart does not entail that provisions like § 2 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act are constitutional. Acceptance of the foregoing line of
reasoning only means that a successful argument for the unconstitutionality
of such enactments should rest on something other than a lack of affirmative
power.
One might think that due process (or some other constitutional principle)
creates a constitutional right to some judicial forum to entertain constitutional
challenges to federal law. That was the conclusion that the Second Circuit
reached in dicta, at least with respect to due process and takings claims."
Or one might think that constitutional structure (in the sense that
Professor Charles Black used the term, to refer to the relations of the
institutions recognized and created by the Constitution)82 limits the otherwise
valid exercise by Congress of any of its powers in a way that aggrandizes
those powers." This view might be understood as extending Henry Hart's
claim that Congress may not exercise its power under the Exceptions Clause
of Article III (about which more will be said in Part IV) in such a way as to
undermine the "essential role" of the Supreme Court to courts of first
81. See Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[W]hile Congress
has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the
Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or to take private property without just compensation.").
82. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7,
67 (1969).
83. Cf Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 1736 (proposing that the Constitution should be
understood to contain a relatively "absolute principle [that] demands a general structure of
constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within the bounds of law").
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instance. The view I am imagining restricts otherwise valid exercises of the
power to make laws necessary and proper to ordaining and establishing lower
federal courts, as well as otherwise valid exercises of the Commerce Clause
(or other Article I, Section Eight) power with respect to state courts. We
might awkwardly call this a limit rooted in the "essential role of lower
courts."
Or one might think that when Congress allows for judicial enforcement
of a federal statute, it must accept judicial review of that same statute as a
necessary ingredient of the courts' law-application role. Citing Marbury, the
Supreme Court said something very much like this when it invalidated on
First Amendment grounds a law that restricted the ability of publicly funded
lawyers to challenge the constitutionality of welfare laws that were otherwise
the subject of litigation. Speaking for the Court and citing Marbury, in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez,84 Justice Kennedy wrote that "Congress cannot
wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source." 5 That principle
might allow Congress to strip state and federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
freestanding constitutional challenges to federal law, while obligating
Congress to leave such courts open to entertaining and acting upon arguments
against the constitutionality of any laws that are otherwise properly before
them.86
In mentioning these potential limits, I do not mean to take a position on
the strength of the arguments for or against any of them. Rather, I simply
wish to underscore the limited scope of the conclusion of this subpart: there
might be good reasons to conclude that Congress may not simultaneously
strip state and federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain constitutional
challenges to federal laws in some or even in all contexts, but those reasons
support what would best be conceptualized as external limits on Congress's
affirmative powers. All things considered, Congress has the affirmative
power to simultaneously strip state and federal courts of jurisdiction to
entertain constitutional challenges to federal laws.
84. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
85. Id. at 545 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)).
86. Throughout this Article, I use the term constitutional "challenge" to encompass both
constitutional claims by plaintiffs and constitutional defenses by defendants because Congress has
no greater or lesser affirmative power to strip courts ofjurisdiction over constitutional claims than
it has over constitutional defenses. However, if one finds the Velazquez-based argument set forth in
the text persuasive, that might supply a reason to think that, quite apart from limits on Congress's
affirmative power, stripping state (or, for that matter, federal) courts ofjurisdiction to hear a federal
constitutional defense, while not otherwise tinkering with the courts' jurisdiction to hear some
category of cases, would be problematic in a way that jurisdiction stripping with respect to
constitutional claims is not.
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D. Constitutional Challenges to State Laws
Suppose Congress enacts a statute stripping both state and federal courts
of jurisdiction to entertain federal constitutional challenges to state laws in
some category of cases-challenges to abortion restrictions, say." With
respect to the federal courts, such a statute exercises (or, more precisely,
refrains from exercising) the Article III power to ordain and establish lower
federal courts. But what power could Congress be exercising in stripping
state courts of jurisdiction in such cases? The short answer is none.
We can see why that is so by examining the powers available to
Congress. As potentially relevant here, Congress has powers to organize the
courts under Article III and substantive regulatory powers, mostly listed in
Article I, Section Eight.
We can dispense with the latter category first. Unlike the jurisdiction-
stripping laws discussed above in subparts III(B) and III(C), a law stripping
state courts of jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional challenges to state
laws could not be said to carry into effect any substantive regulatory power,
because it does not accompany any substantive federal regulatory enactment.
When Congress attaches conditions to the exercise of its Spending power but
bars state and federal court jurisdiction to entertain lawsuits alleging that a
recipient of federal funds failed to comply with one or more of those
conditions, we can conceptualize the jurisdiction-stripping provision as itself
connected to the exercise (or rather, the partial withholding of the exercise)
of the Spending power. When Congress regulates pursuant to the Commerce
Clause but bars state and federal court jurisdiction to challenge the
substantive regulatory provisions, we can conceptualize the jurisdiction-
stripping provision as likewise connected to the exercise of the Commerce
power. However, when Congress simply bars federal constitutional
challenges to state laws, there is no substantive law even in the vicinity, so to
87. In recent decades, members of Congress have shown special interest in stripping courts of
jurisdiction in cases involving divisive social issues. See generally, e.g., Pledge Protection Act of
2007, H.R. 699, 110th Cong. (2007) (amending Title 28 with respect to jurisdiction over cases
regarding the Pledge of Allegiance); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong.
(2004) (removing federal jurisdiction over certain claims by state officers regarding religion);
Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) (limiting jurisdiction over
questions under the Defense of Marriage Act); Life-Protecting Judicial Limitation Act of 2003, H.R.
1546, 108th Cong. (2003) (eliminating federal court jurisdiction over any "abortion-related case");
H.R. 761, 97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating federal court jurisdiction over forced school attendance);
Voluntary Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings Act, H.R. 4756, 97th Cong. (1981) (limiting
jurisdiction in cases involving voluntary prayer in public schools or buildings); 101 CONG. REC.
S8700 (daily ed. June 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms) (proposing amendment to later unenacted
bill limiting jurisdiction in cases regarding flag burning). Although bills such as those just listed
(none of which was ultimately enacted) typically would leave state courts open, it is not difficult to
imagine that the same forces that produce bills stripping federal courts of jurisdiction would
sometimes produce bills stripping all courts of jurisdiction. For a review of proposed jurisdiction-
stripping legislation introduced during and opposed by presidential administrations from the second
President Roosevelt through the second President Bush, see generally Grove, supra note 2.
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speak, and so we cannot plausibly describe the jurisdiction-stripping
provision as connected to any substantive power.
At first blush, it would appear that the power to ordain and establish the
lower federal courts cannot be the basis for stripping state courts of
jurisdiction to entertain federal constitutional challenges to state laws. And
indeed, I shall ultimately reach the conclusion that it does not confer any such
power. However, before coming to that conclusion, I must address a
superficially appealing argument by analogy to a point I made in the previous
subpart.
In subpart III(C), I reasoned that because Congress undoubtedly could
close state courts to federal constitutional challenges to some class of federal
statutes if it left the federal courts open, it can likewise do so even when it
closes the federal courts-at least, so far as an affirmative power like the
Commerce power is concerned. Well, it might be asked, Why doesn't the
same logic apply to federal constitutional challenges to state laws? After all,
Congress undoubtedly could close state courts to federal constitutional
challenges to some class of state statutes if it left the federal courts open. So,
wouldn't the same logic I applied above indicate that Congress can also close
the state courts as to these cases even when it closes the federal courts?
In a word, no. In subpart III(C), my argument rested entirely on the fact
that Congress was exercising a power in addition to the power to ordain and
establish lower federal courts when it closed state courts to prevent state court
interference with a federal substantive enactment-namely, whatever power
Congress was exercising in the substantive enactment. However, in either
context-whether Congress is closing state courts to challenges to federal
laws or to state laws-its power to ordain and establish lower federal courts
only has any bearing when Congress leaves federal courts open. Why?
Because closing state courts to some category of claims can only plausibly
be seen as necessary and proper to ordaining and establishing lower federal
courts when the state-court-closing measure is part of a scheme to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts. If Congress closes both state and
federal courts, then the act that does so cannot plausibly be tied to its power
to ordain and establish the lower federal courts.
Thus, neither the power to ordain and establish lower federal courts nor
any of Congress's substantive powers found in Article I, Section Eight or
elsewhere provides Congress with the affirmative power to close state as well
as federal courts to federal constitutional challenges to state laws. In short,
Congress lacks such a power.
Some readers may find the juxtaposition of the conclusions in subparts
III(C) and III(D) odd or even perverse. After all, as a normative matter it
could be argued that Congress should have less power to strip courts of
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to federal laws than to state
laws, because when Congress strips courts of power to review the validity of
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federal laws, it engages in a form of self-dealing. And yet, I have concluded
that Congress has the affirmative power to strip state and federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to its own laws while it lacks
that power with respect to state laws.
That result is less anomalous than it might at first appear for three
reasons. First, to repeat a point with which readers by now may have grown
weary, to the extent that one thinks that there is a pressing need for
constitutional review of federal, as well as state statutes, that need may factor
into an argument for some other kind of limit on jurisdiction stripping. The
conclusion that Congress has the affirmative power to strip state and federal
courts of such power does not imply that the exercise of such power survives
constitutional scrutiny under other theories.
Second, although Congress has almost never passed legislation stripping
both state and federal courts of jurisdiction over a class of constitutional
claims,8 8 it has frequently considered bills that would limit the jurisdiction of
various courts to hear constitutional challenges. In recent decades, such bills
have frequently targeted hot-button social issues such as busing, abortion,
flag burning, school prayer, and same-sex marriage-areas where state law
has regulatory primacy.89 Because resistance to the Court's decisions tends
to vary by region, and thus by state, the greater threat to constitutional values
may come from state legislatures rather than from Congress,9 0 a conclusion
broadly consistent with James Madison's fears about the relative threat of
tyranny in small versus large polities expressed in The Federalist No. 10.91
88. The Portal-to-Portal Act is a notable exception. So is § 7 of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, which was held to violate the Suspension Clause in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
733 (2008). The text of that provision was sufficiently encompassing to bar jurisdiction in state as
well as federal courts. When Boumediene was decided, the statutory text provided, as it does now:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
Id. at 736. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2012). Because state courts lack the power to grant writs of
habeas corpus to federal prisoners, see Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397,411-12 (1871), even if the statute
were construed as only stripping federal courts of jurisdiction, the result would be to leave no
court-state or federal-with jurisdiction in the specified class of cases.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (giving examples of bills that would strip courts
ofjurisdiction in cases involving divisive social issues).
90. Cf Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 975, 1000-01 (2004) (noting
"that the constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination has had a greater impact on state
governments" than on the federal government, while noting also that with respect to this particular
issue "regional differences have diminished with time").
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison
explained:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
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Thus, in order to maintain the supremacy of federal constitutional law, the
need for judicial review of state laws may be greater than the need for judicial
review of federal laws.
Third, the need for constitutional review may be greater in cases
challenging state rather than federal laws because of the interest in
uniformity. Echoing the decisive rationale for Justice Story's opinion for the
Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,92 Justice Holmes famously remarked: "I
do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if
we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." 93
To be sure, Holmes was discussing judicial review by the Supreme
Court, not by state courts or lower federal courts, and without review by a
single body such as the Supreme Court, uniformity cannot be readily
maintained because different state courts could provide different
interpretations of the Constitution. Thus, the conclusion that Congress lacks
the affirmative power to strip all courts of jurisdiction over constitutional
challenges to state laws does not, standing alone, ensure uniformity.
However, the limit identified here need not stand alone. As the next Part
explores, the proposition that Congress lacks affirmative power to strip both
state and lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges
to state laws has potential implications for the Supreme Court's own
jurisdiction because it interacts with other possible limits on congressional
power to strip jurisdiction.
IV. Practical Implications
Part III concluded that Congress lacks the affirmative power to strip
state courts ofjurisdiction over federal constitutional challenges to state laws
when it also closes federal courts to such challenges. That conclusion is
important because it does not rest on any of the controversial theories that
have hitherto been proposed as limits on the power of Congress to restrict the
jurisdiction of state and federal courts. It stands even if one accepts the
default view that neither Article III nor any other provision of the
Constitution limits the power of Congress to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction.
This Part asks how much the limit I have identified really matters, given
the possibility that state courts in states that defy federal constitutional norms
would themselves be hostile to those constitutional norms. The answer is at
least a little and potentially quite a bit. After describing a few instances of
Id.
92. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
93. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court: Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law




heroic actions by state court judges in subpart IV(A), I explain in subparts
IV(B) and IV(C) how the limitation on affirmative power interacts with the
less controversial of the two main families of such other theories-those that
build on Hart's view that Congress may not exercise its power under the
Exceptions Clause in a way that undermines the Supreme Court's "essential
role."
A. State Court Hostility to Federal Constitutional Rights
As noted above, in modem times, members of Congress have introduced
jurisdiction-stripping legislation most frequently when the subject matter
concerned what might loosely be called "social" issues-such as busing,
abortion, flag burning, school prayer, and same-sex marriage.94 Public
opinion on such questions shows polarization along a number of dimensions,
including geography.9' While much of the geographic polarization reflects
different attitudes in urban, suburban, and rural areas,96 there are also regional
differences that are reflected in state legislatures.97 And although attitudes of
state court judges do not necessarily mirror popular attitudes in their
respective states precisely, other things being equal, we can expect a
correlation. For example, the South Dakota legislature is more likely than the
Vermont legislature to enact abortion restrictions,9 8 and the South Dakota
Supreme Court is more likely to uphold any given abortion restriction than
the Vermont Supreme Court would be.99
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (giving examples of bills proposed in Congress
that would have stripped courts ofjurisdiction in cases involving divisive social issues).
95. See generally Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12,
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
[https://perma.cc/M3JF-TZ7Z] (describing a general increase in polarization between the two major
American political parties); James A. Thompson & Jesse Sussell, Is Geographic Clustering Driving
Political Polarization?, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/02/is-geographic-clustering-
driving-political-polarization/?utmterm-.e5l659bed9cb [https://perma.cc/K3ME-AWJR]
(identifying "geographic clustering" as a primary cause of this polarization).
96. See Dante J. Scala & Kenneth M. Johnson, Political Polarization Along the Rural-Urban
Continuum? The Geography of the Presidential Vote, 2000-2016, 672 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 162, 168 (2017) (documenting varying political attitudes in urban and rural
communities in the United States).
97. See generally State of the States, GALLUP: NEWS, http://news.gallup.com/poll/125066
/state-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/J7CL-L2MU] (providing extensive data regarding average
political beliefs by state).
98. See State Governments, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., https://www.prochoiceamerica.org
/laws-policy/state-government/ [https://perma.cc/9M74-EBYY] (providing comparative data
regarding abortion legislation for all fifty states, and rating Vermont's legislature as strongly
supportive of abortion rights and South Dakota's as strongly opposed).
99. Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure ofState Supreme Court
Ideology, 31 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 472, 487-88,490 (2015) (comparing various state court ideological
compositions, including charts depicting the South Dakota Supreme Court as historically
conservative and the Vermont Supreme Court as traditionally liberal).
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Accordingly, the lack of affirmative congressional power to close state
courts to federal constitutional challenges to state laws does not leave
plaintiffs who would bring such challenges with much reassurance that they
will succeed-even if they have good claims on the merits. To continue the
foregoing example, suppose Congress strips state and federal courts of the
authority to hear challenges to abortion restrictions. South Dakota responds
by enacting a law that would be invalidated by the federal courts applying
existing precedent, but that, by hypothesis, they lack jurisdiction to consider.
Under the analysis set forth in Part IHl, the jurisdiction-stripping law is invalid
as applied to the state courts, and thus the plaintiffs are able to bring their
challenge there. However, because the state judges in South Dakota are
substantially less sympathetic to abortion rights than their federal
counterparts, they uphold the law.
The scenario just described is entirely plausible, even likely in the sort
of circumstances that would produce the enactment of jurisdiction-stripping
legislation, but it is not inevitable-at least not in every case. Even state court
judges who can be removed by state electoral politics have, on occasion,
stood up for principle as they saw it, even on hot-button social issues.
Relying on a combination of state and federal grounds, a liberal majority
of the California Supreme Court reversed nearly every death sentence for
close to a decade between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, despite growing
popular support in the state for capital punishment during that period."'o In
2009, the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously rendered a decision making the
Hawkeye State only the third in the country to grant legal recognition to
same-sex marriage,101 notwithstanding the fact that a clear majority of Iowans
opposed same-sex marriage at the time. 102
It is easy to read the experiences of the California and Iowa Supreme
Courts as cautionary tales. After all, largely in response to their respective
rulings on the death penalty and same-sex marriage, the key justices of each
court lost their seats when they faced the voters.1 03 But it is not clear that their
100. See Scott G. Harper & David P. Hubbard, The Evidencefor Death, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 973,
978-80 (1990) (recounting growing public opposition to the California Supreme Court's rulings
rejecting most death sentences in the 1970s and 1980s).
101. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009). Massachusetts was the first, also by
judicial decision. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003). New
Hampshire was the second, by legislation. Equal Access to Marriage, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
XLIII. Domestic Relations, § 457:1-a (2018) (effective date Jan. 1, 2010).
102. Iowa Polls Show Shifting Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 28,
2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/iowa-poll/2015/04/28/gay-
marriage-iowa-poll-supreme-court/26543751/ [https://perma.cc/8R2P-LMEQ] (reporting 2008
statewide poll that found 62% of respondents opposed and only 32% of respondents in favor of legal
same-sex marriage).
103. Robert Lindsey, The Elections: The Story in Some Key States; Deukmejian and Cranston
Win as 3 Judges Are Ousted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/l1/06/us
/elections-story-some-key-states-deukmejian-cranston-win-3-judges-are-ousted.html
[https://perma.cc/NXW7-EJXV]; A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster oflowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench,
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willingness to act ii a countermajoritarian manner should thus be judged as
a failure.
The California Supreme Court's skeptical attitude towards the death
penalty has largely persisted long after the state's voters relieved its initial
champions of their responsibilities. In the nearly four decades since the 1978
ascension and subsequent removal of the court's anti-death penalty majority,
California has executed exactly thirteen prisoners.' By comparison, during
that same period, Texas, with a smaller population, has executed over five
hundred.10' Of course, to death penalty opponents, even thirteen executions
is thirteen too many, but it is worth recalling that the anti-death penalty
majority on the California Supreme Court never invalidated the death penalty
per se.106
Meanwhile, although a majority of the Iowa justices who found a state
constitutional right to same-sex marriage were ousted from the state high
court, the precedent persisted. Same-sex marriage remained legal in Iowa,
and the ruling making it so was later listed in an appendix in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision finding a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage-
invoked by the majority as evidence of growing support for the institution."
In both California and Iowa, the individual justices who stood up for principle
(as they saw it) no doubt suffered professional consequences for taking a
stand, but the principles survived.
Sometimes the U.S. Supreme Court "follows th' iliction returns"108 but
not always. Likewise, even state court judges who face the prospect of direct
accountability to the electorate do not always decide cases in accordance with
popular opinion, even on hot-button social issues. Accordingly, assuming
arguendo that the limit on affirmative congressional power is the only limit
the Constitution places on jurisdiction stripping, that limit is worth
something, because state judges will occasionally buck popular opinion in
their state.
That said, there can be little doubt that a constitutional right that can
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html
[https://perma.cc/YAV4-F7GP].
104. Inmates Executed, 1978 to Present, CAL. DEP'T CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/CapitalPunishment/InmatesExecuted~html [https://perma.cc/2KW7-
49DW] (last updated Oct. 2, 2015).
105. Death Row Since 1974, TEx. EXECUTION INFO. CTR., http://www.txexecutions.org/
statistics.asp [https://perma.cc/HM5V-PVRH].
106. See People v. Easley, 654 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Cal. 1982), vacated and rev'd on other
grounds, 671 P.2d 813 (1983) (upholding a capital conviction and, in a portion of the opinion that
was not subsequently vacated, explicitly rejecting the argument that the death penalty was
categorically unconstitutional).
107. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) ("[T]he highest courts of many
States have contributed to this ongoing dialogue in decisions interpreting their own State
Constitutions."); id. app. A at 2610 (listing Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)).
108. FINLEY P. DuNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
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only be enforced against a state alleged to be violating it in the courts of that
very state is less valuable than a right that can be enforced in some federal
court as well. The next two subparts explain how a relatively modest limit on
congressional jurisdiction-stripping authority, in addition to the limit on
affirmative power, combines with that affirmative-power limit to ensure
access to the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of state
legislation.
B. Story-Based Theories Versus Hart-Based Theories
The leading academic theories positing limits on the power of Congress
to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation can be grouped into two broad
families, which I shall associate with Justice Joseph Story and Professor
Henry Hart, respectively. Story's theory-articulated in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee by Story and refined into a number of variations by modem scholars,
most notably Professor Akhil Amar'lo-is grounded in the text of Article III.
Hart's theory-as well as its various permutations-aims for consistency
with the text but does not purport to be derived from it. My aim here is not to
show that either or both are correct or incorrect. Rather, I want to show that
Hart-based "essential role" theories are more modest than Story-based
theories. For the sake of simplicity, if not perfect accuracy, I shall refer to
each family of theories by reference to its respective founder, glossing over
important differences of nuance among the followers of each school of
thought.
1. Story's View.-Story-based theories emphasize the text of
Article III, Section Two, which states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under" federal law."'o To
oversimplify, Story-based theories construe this language to mean that some
federal court must have jurisdiction to entertain every case arising under
federal law."' Such theories thus operate as internal limits on the scope of
congressional power under a combination of the Madisonian Compromise
(of Article III, Section One) and the Exceptions Clause (of Article III,
109. See generally Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 22, at 206 (building on elements
of a view most closely associated with Justice Story to argue that Article III requires some federal
court to be open to federal question cases, but agreeing with Hart that the Framers "did not intend
to require the creation of lower federal courts"); Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure, supra note 22, at
1501 (asserting that while Justice Story's theory is "not without flaws," it "deserves especially close
attention").
110. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. Article IlI, Section Two also uses the "all Cases" language with
respect "to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" and "to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," but these need not concern us here.
111. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 56 U. CM. L. REV. 443, 479 (1989) ("Congress may except such cases from the
Supreme Court's appellate docket only if Congress simultaneously authorizes some other Article III
court(s) to hear, at least on appeal, all excepted cases.").
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Section Two). Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts,
and it can limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; however, according to
Story-based theories, it cannot simultaneously limit both sets of courts if the
result would be that no federal court has jurisdiction over some subset of
cases arising under federal law.
Story-based theories do not rest on text alone, but neither do criticisms
of the view." 2 The most compelling criticism may be that, whatever the
merits of a Story-based "all means all" theory if one were writing on a blank
slate, in all of U.S. history it has never been the law. The Judiciary Act of
1789 did not, except in a few special circumstances, vest federal question
jurisdiction in the lower federal courts, nor did it provide access to the
Supreme Court in cases in which the party relying on federal law prevailed
in state court."' When Congress did vest federal question jurisdiction in
federal trial courts in 1875, it included an amount-in-controversy minimum
that left numerous cases out.1' Congress did not eliminate the jurisdictional
minimum until 1980."1
Even today, numerous cases that arise under federal law for Article HI
purposes do not fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal district
courts because the federal question arises as a defense or in response to a
defense and, thus, fails to satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule."'
Moreover, even if one entertains the dubious assumption that the small
possibility of review by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari suffices to
discharge the ostensible duty of Congress to vest federal court jurisdiction
over "all" federal question cases, that still leaves the modem jurisdictional
framework noncompliant with the Story-based approach.
To see why, suppose a case in which a federal question arises by way of
defense, so that it falls outside the original jurisdiction of the federal district
courts. Suppose further that the highest court of the state rules in favor of the
defendant on alternative grounds: both the federal defense and a state law
defense prevail. The Supreme Court cannot hear this case provided that the
112. For a useful summary of the debate, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 319-22 (7th ed., 2015)
[hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER] (discussing Sager, supra note 15); Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View, supra note 22, at 229-45; Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure, supra note 22, at 1501-44; Martin
H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1633, 1633-34 (1990) (summarizing Professor Amar's theory, which adopts some Story-
based views, and criticizing it on both textual and historical grounds).
113. Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87
(1789).
114. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875).
115. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, 96 Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 1, 94
Stat. 2369 (1980).
116. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that
jurisdiction is only conferred if "the plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action shows that it is
based upon those laws or that Constitution").
36 [Vol. 97:1
Congressional Power
state law ground is adequate and independent, as it frequently will be.117 We
thus have a case-really a large class of cases-that arises under federal law
but over which no federal court can ever exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly,
at no time from the founding through the present has the jurisdictional
framework reflected Story's view.
What, then, did the framers and ratifiers mean by preceding some heads
of jurisdiction in Article III with the word "all"? Judge William Fletcher
makes a powerful argument that by selectively using the word "all,"
Article III distinguishes between those categories of cases over which
Congress may choose to grant some federal court exclusive jurisdiction and
those categories over which Congress may only confer concurrent
jurisdiction." 8 With characteristic modesty, Fletcher acknowledges that he
has not "found the single right answer to the meaning of 'all' in Article III,"
but his reading does seem to "make[] the most sense of the available historical
materials.""'
It is, of course, possible to imagine that an approach to understanding
the Constitution that was never heretofore accepted could come to be seen as
correct. After all, before the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right
to same-sex marriage,120 the Constitution had never been construed to include
such a right (except by lower courts in the brief period leading up to the
Supreme Court decision). Thus, if Story-based approaches to Article III were
defended as giving effect to an evolving understanding of the role of federal
courts in American constitutional democracy, the centuries-old practice to
the contrary might be overcome. However, Story-based approaches tend to
be defended as a recovery of the original (or at least early) understanding.1 21
If there is a good Living-Constitutionalist defense of Story-based theories, it
lacks a champion.
I do not wish to leave readers with the impression that Story-based
theories are necessarily wrong. I have given only an abbreviated account of
a very large and sophisticated literature. My point here is simply that Story-
based theories are highly controversial.
117. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
118. See William A. Fletcher, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: The Meaning ofthe Word "All" in Article III, 59 DUKE L.J. 929, 952 (2010).
119. Id.
120. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protect the right of same-sex couples to
marry).
121. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1058-59 (criticizing much of the academic literature, including




2. Hart's View.-In his landmark Dialogue, Hart argued that
congressional power to make exceptions to and regulations of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction carries with it an internal limit: "exceptions
must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in
the constitutional plan."l22 Hart acknowledged the vagueness of this limit,
but thought that an indeterminate limit was preferable to no limit at all,
because the latter would authorize "reading the Constitution as authorizing
its own destruction[.]"'2 3 In any event, Hart also thought that "essential role"
was no more vague than the tests the courts have adopted to implement other
constitutional provisions. 124
So, what is the Supreme Court's essential role? The Court itself has not
had occasion to say. A leading expositor of Hart's theory canvassed the text,
structure, history, and precedent to reach the conclusion that any
congressional restrictions on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction must
preserve its "essential constitutional functions of maintaining the uniformity
and supremacy of federal law." 12 5
This view is hardly uncontroversial. Like the view of Story and his
followers, it bucks history.1 2 6 However, by narrowing the essential role view
we can make it substantially less controversial. As Professor Lawrence Sager
has argued, "the essential function claim is strongest when narrowed to
Supreme Court review of state court decisions that repudiate federal
constitutional claims of right." 27 Sager's argument for such a core to the
Court's jurisdiction is rooted chiefly in the history and purpose of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,1 28 but it is also striking that this
narrowest, strongest version of the Hartian essential role view is not
embarrassed by post-enactment history.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed for Supreme Court review (by writ
of error) in just those cases in which state courts rejected a federal claim or
defense. Moreover, in modem times, the adequate-and-independent-state-
122. Hart, supra note 15.
123. Id.
124. See id. ("Ask yourself whether it is any more [indeterminate] than the tests which the Court
has evolved to meet other hard situations."). Here I have equated the view of the character "A" in
Hart's Dialogue with Hart's own view. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 112, at 330-33
(making the same assumption).
125. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201 (1960).
126. See HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 112, at 315 (describing jurisdictional gaps as
inconsistent with "essential functions" view); see also id. at 315-16 (discussing criticisms by
Gunther, supra note 1, at 896-97, and Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005-06 (1965) (arguing that Story's view is inconsistent with "the plan of
the Constitution for the courts" and citing Marbury as early precedent to that effect)).
127. Sager, supra note 15, at 44.
128. See id. at 45-56 (inferring from the structure and history of the Constitution a "firm
commitment to federal judicial supervision of the states").
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law-ground doctrine is also consistent with the Sager's version of Hart's
view. If a state court rules against a party relying on federal law, then there
is no state-law-ground bar to Supreme Court review. True, the Court cannot
review asserted overprotection of a federal claim or defense where state law
provides an adequate and independent state law ground, but such cases fall
outside the core.
Notably, Sager's core category ensures neither supremacy nor
uniformity in its entirety, but it ensures the intersection of the two. It does not
ensure supremacy because-consistent with Holmes's observation-the core
includes the Martin power but not the Marbury power. 12 9 Nor does the core
category ensure uniformity because it leaves states free to over-enforce
federal constitutional norms. However, the greater threat to uniformity has
always been selective state under-enforcement of federal norms, because the
provision of additional layers of protection can already be accomplished via
state law.1 3 0
Before turning to the interaction of the strongest form of Hart's theory
with the analysis of affirmative power in Part III, we might pause to identify
one further advantage of Hart-based theories over Story-based theories.
Insofar as Story-based theories require the creation of lower federal courts,
.they run squarely into the Madisonian Compromise. By contrast, Hart-based
theories construe only the Exceptions Clause. In positing that Congress may
not eliminate all of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, they draw
support from the very concept of an "exception."
Thus, Hart-based theories are easier to square with the text of Article III
than Story-based theories. And as we have seen, Sager's core-reserving to
the Supreme Court against interference by Congress the power to review state
court decisions that repudiate federal constitutional claims-also squares
well with the history of the federal courts' actual jurisdiction.
C. The Interaction ofAffirmative Power and Hart-Based Theories
We can now examine how the limit on affirmative congressional power
to strip state courts of jurisdiction interacts with the extant theories
articulating other limits on jurisdiction stripping.
129. Sager himself marshaled additional arguments to conclude that, although weaker, the case
for including the Marbury power within the Court's "essential functions" is nonetheless persuasive.
See id. at 56-68 (reviewing the judicial independence requirements of Article III in conjunction
with the "essential function" view to conclude that "[s]ome effective form of federal judicial review
under article III must be available for claims of constitutional right").
130. Put differently, the solo dissent of Justice Stevens in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), was wrong as an interpretation of the Supreme Court's statutory jurisdiction but right in
identifying the Court's priorities. See id. at 1065-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
decision to exercise jurisdiction over state courts' decisions that are unclear about whether they rest
on federal grounds rather than on independent and adequate state grounds and concluding that "in
reviewing the decisions of state courts, the primary role of [the] Court is to make sure that persons
who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard" (emphasis in original)).
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As noted above in subpart IV(A), if one accepts the default view that
Congress has plenary power under the Madisonian Compromise and the
Exceptions Clause, then the limit identified in subpart III(D) is the only limit
(save for true external limits of the sort that restrict the criteria Congress may
include in any law, including jurisdictional provisions, such as a law
selectively closing courthouse doors based on race or sex). As noted above
in subpart IV(A), that would mean that persons challenging state laws on
federal constitutional grounds would need to rely entirely on state courts to
vindicate their claims and defenses. In such circumstances, state courts would
not be worthless-because state judges sometimes resist political pressure-
but one could not consistently count on the same solicitude for federal
constitutional claims and defenses that broader court access would provide.
At the other pole, if one were to adopt one of the theories articulating
broad limits on congressional jurisdiction-stripping authority, then my
observations in Part III, while of academic interest, would have little practical
import. Those theories already treat laws closing both state and federal courts
to constitutional challenges to state laws (and much more) as unconstitutional
on other grounds. The determination that such laws are also outside of
affirmative congressional power would simply add an additional, alternative
basis for a conclusion already reached.
However, suppose one rejects both extremes in favor of a modest limit
that comports with the history and structure of Article III. Suppose, that is,
(1) that one thinks Congress has plenary power under the Madisonian
Compromise, but that Professor Hart is correct that Congress may not use its
power under the Exceptions Clause so as to destroy the Supreme Court's
"central role" in our constitutional system and (2) that one thinks that the
essential function of the Supreme Court is the maintenance of the supremacy
and uniformity of federal constitutional law, and that Justice Holmes and
Professor Sager are right that the power to review state court decisions
rejecting federal constitutional challenges to state laws is the core of that
essential function of the Supreme Court. If so, then the conclusion of Part III
regarding affirmative power perfectly complements this most plausible and
modest limit on congressional power under the Exceptions Clause.
To see how the pieces fit together, consider the relevant provisions that
ensure that the Supreme Court has the authority to invalidate state laws that
conflict with the federal Constitution.
(1) In order to perform its essential function of maintaining the
uniformity and supremacy of federal constitutional law, the Supreme Court
must have the power to hear cases in which a state court rejects a
constitutional challenge to a state law.' 3 '
131. The Supreme Court cannot perform this function via its own original jurisdiction because




(2) By virtue of the Supremacy Clause (as construed in Testa v. Kattl3 2),
state courts of general jurisdiction are obligated to entertain federal
constitutional questions (and federal questions more broadly).
(3) That obligation is defeasible where Congress vests exclusive
jurisdiction in federal courts, but where Congress closes the federal courts to
state constitutional claims (exercising its power to do so under the
Madisonian Compromise), it lacks the affirmative power to close the state
courts as well.
(4) Thus, there will always be a pathway by which a party relying on the
federal Constitution to challenge a state law has access to federal court.133
Either Congress authorizes original jurisdiction in federal court or state courts
must be open, and if the state court rejects the federal constitutional
challenge, access to the U.S. Supreme Court must be available. 134
V. Conclusion
Despite the voluminous, high-quality literature on the scope of
Congress's power to strip courts of jurisdiction, no sustained scholarly
attention has previously been paid to the question of what affirmative power
Congress exercises when it strips state courts ofjurisdiction. This Article has
attempted to fill that gap by distinguishing four categories of jurisdiction-
stripping provisions. For three of these, one or more of the powers to ordain
and establish lower federal courts and the substantive regulatory powers set
forth mostly in Article I, Section Eight suffice. However, Congress lacks
affirmative power to simultaneously close both state and federal courts to
federal constitutional challenges to state laws.
Standing alone, that conclusion is important, even on the assumption
that congressional power under both the Madisonian Compromise and the
Exceptions Clause is plenary-what I have called the default view. For
although a state court in the state that enacted an arguably unconstitutional
law may be less sympathetic to the challenge than would be a federal court,
state court judges bound by the Supremacy Clause to uphold the Constitution
can and often do stand up to political pressure.
132. 330 U.S. 386, 389-90, 394 (1947).
133. No alternative pathway guarantees the Supreme Court a supply of cases. To be sure, the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over various cases "in which a State shall be Party," U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, but most challenges to the constitutionality of state laws will not involve
the state as a party. Private suits seeking to restrain unconstitutional state action will be brought
against state officials rather than the state itself due to the state's sovereign immunity, see Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978) (per curiam) (disallowing claims against the state itself for
injunctive relief, even while allowing similar claims against state officials), and many challenges to
the constitutionality of state laws may arise in litigation involving only private parties. Thus, the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction does not provide an adequate basis for it to perform its
essential function of adjudicating constitutional challenges to state laws.
134. Note that for these purposes, the possibility of a writ of certiorari counts as access even if
the Supreme Court denies the petition for the writ in any particular case.
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Moreover, the conclusion regarding affirmative power does not stand
alone. The strongest argument against treating congressional power over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts as plenary asserts that Congress may not
interfere with the essential functions of the Supreme Court-the core of
which consists of reviewing state court decisions rejecting constitutional
claims and defenses. Thus, read alongside the extant jurisdiction-stripping
literature, the analysis contained in this Article makes possible a role for the
Supreme Court that Justice Holmes and many others have deemed essential
to the survival of the Union.
In conclusion, consider an almost astonishing aspect of the framework
set forth above. The argument for the limit to affirmative congressional
power in Part III proceeded completely independently of the arguments that
figure in the extant literature on other sorts of limits on jurisdiction stripping
discussed in Part IV. It just works out as a fortuitous coincidence that the best
account of the scope of Congress's affirmative power so neatly complements
the least controversial of the theories articulating limits on the power of
Congress under Article III to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
including the Supreme Court.
The complementarity of these independent arguments might point to a
single underlying cause: namely, the original understanding. However, I have
not undertaken the historical study that would be necessary to reach a
conclusion about whether, as a matter of the subjective intentions and
expectations of the framers and ratifiers, or as a matter of the original public
meaning of the words of the relevant constitutional provisions, there even
existed a determinate understanding about how those provisions would
interact. I am skeptical that it did,'35 but in any event, the complementarity of
the pieces of the arguments discussed in this Article counts in favor of each
of the pieces, regardless of whether it reflects a deliberate design of the
framers and ratifiers. Textual interpretation-including constitutional
interpretation-properly aims for coherence."' Accordingly, whatever can
be said about the original understanding of congressional power to strip state
courts of jurisdiction or the Exceptions Clause, the fact that a sound
construction of each complements the other makes these respective
constructions mutually reinforcing.
135. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 112, at 322 (noting "widespread acknowledgement
that the materials from the founding period are quite limited and cryptic with regard to disputed
issues about the meaning of Article III").
136. On the virtues of "coherentist" accounts, see generally PHILLIP BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (describing constitutional interpretation as consisting
of various interpretive modalities); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) (applying his theory that judges aim for results that best
fit with precedent and principles of political morality); and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1237-51 (1987)
(offering a descriptive-normative-hybrid account of constitutional practice that aims to reconcile
different forms of arguments, supplemented by a hierarchy for cases of irreconcilable conflict).
42 [Vol. 97:1
